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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

3 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Deployment of Army Rocket Troops in an Operation of the Initial Period of War

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. This article cites measures to ensure readiness of missile units for operation upon alert and when there is a period of threat. Provision should be made for appropriate siting areas, deployment of missile-technical bases and meteorological stations, and for the secure communications means required for control. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (78) for 1966. The Russian-language version was disseminated as FIRDB-312/03886-74.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned the [] Codeword []

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William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

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DATE OF
INFO. Mid-1966

DATE 3 October 1975

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Deployment of Army Rocket
Troops in an Operation of the
Initial Period of War

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (78) for 1966 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. The author of this article is General-Mayor of Artillery M. Makarychev. This article cites measures to ensure readiness of missile units for operation upon alert and when there is a period of threat. Provision should be made for appropriate siting areas, deployment of missile-technical bases and meteorological stations, and for the secure communications means required for control.

End of Summary Comment:

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Mikhail Ivanovich Makarychev, a Hero of the Soviet Union, took charge of the Rocket Troops and Artillery in the Moscow Military District on 31 August 1969, and was promoted to General-Leytenant in the latter part of 1971. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970. The Russian-language version of this article was disseminated as FIRDB-312/03886-74.

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The Deployment of Army Rocket Troops
in an Operation of the Initial Period of War
by
General-Mayor of Artillery M. Makarychev

In the first operation of the initial period of a war, a timely first nuclear strike will have decisive importance for the destruction of the opposing enemy grouping. Therefore, the movement of rocket troops from permanent areas and their deployment must be carried out in a manner which will ensure their readiness for carrying out their assigned tasks in accordance with the plan of the front commander.

The results of exercises show that, under conditions when an army begins an operation by moving from alert assembly areas, and its missile brigade is called upon for the first massed nuclear strike and is deployed near its permanent deployment areas, the following points are extremely important in ensuring that the brigade is ready to launch missiles:

- the advance preparation of alert assembly areas as siting areas, separated by a distance of 10 to 20 kilometers from the permanent deployment areas;
- the creation of the necessary reserve of missiles and warheads at mobile missile-technical bases, as well as missiles and propellant components in the missile units. In order to save a great deal of time on the preparation and delivery of missiles to the battalions, it is desirable to maintain the warheads in the mobile missile-technical bases at Special Readiness 5 with an allotment of one for each launcher;
- the timely allocation of tasks on the preparation of the required number of missiles, warheads, or ready missiles, and their delivery to the missile units;
- the establishment of reliable communications within the brigade and stable communications and precise cooperation between the missile brigade and the separate mobile missile-technical base, and the missile battalions of large units and the army mobile missile-technical bases. This can be accomplished if the chief of rocket troops and artillery has direct command over the mobile missile-technical bases;
- timely and precisely organized meteorological support.

If there is a threatening period prior to the time that an army goes on an offensive, the movement of missile and missile-technical units to their siting areas (deployment areas) and preparations for carrying out

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their tasks can be made over a period of one to two nights. One battalion of a missile brigade can be deployed in its combat alert assembly area and remain on alert while the other battalions are moving and deploying in their siting areas.

Missile units must have one missile for each launcher when they are moving from the alert assembly areas. In some cases they may receive ready missiles in the course of the march or at their siting areas. Reconnaissance groups are sent out at least two to 2.5 hours before the start of a march.

Motorized rifle subunits in armored personnel carriers should be assigned to the commanders of missile and missile-technical units for security and defense purposes.

The distance between missile deployment areas and the forward edge (state border) may be 40 to 60 kilometers for a missile brigade and eight to 12 kilometers for tactical missile battalions.

The siting areas and routes of travel for tactical missile battalions are set by the commanders of the motorized rifle (tank) divisions, and only in cases when the battalions are being used to accomplish tasks under an army plan will the siting areas be assigned by the army headquarters.

The deployment areas of missile-technical bases may be 15 to 40 kilometers from the siting areas of missile large units and units.

A most difficult situation may develop for the rocket troops when combat operations begin while they are under way and they are forced to deploy for the fulfilment of tasks from the march in unprepared siting areas.

Experience gained in exercises shows that it is best to designate possible siting areas along the routes of travel of rocket troops in the event that they are forced to deploy. Missile units should have their own means for the topogeodetic preparation of launching sites and for meteorological support. Provisions may be made for the leapfrog movement of meteorological stations and their deployment for operation every 30 to 50 kilometers. The deployment areas and operating procedures of meteorological stations should be reported to the commanders of the missile units.

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Permanent wire communications lines and messenger means of communications are used to control the missile units in the alert assembly areas (siting areas near the areas of permanent deployment). Radios should be used only to receive.

When the rocket troops are moving to their siting areas, communications within the brigades should be maintained with ultra-shortwave radios and messenger means of communications.

During preparations at the siting areas for the first nuclear strike, communications with the missile brigade and the battalions should be carried out over radio-relay and wire telephone and telegraph channels equipped with secure communications equipment and other ultra-shortwave radio sets. It is forbidden to transmit over shortwave radio sets during this period.

On the basis of the results of exercises, we believe that the chief of rocket troops and artillery of an army should have certain permanently secure communications means for the control of missile and missile-technical large units and units.

To increase the reliability of control it would be desirable to have highly mobile tropospheric radio sets with an operating range of at least 120 kilometers.

Missile-technical units are experiencing an acute need for secure communications equipment, and shortwave radios should be included in their table of organization and equipment for the purpose of communicating with missile transporters.

The results of exercises also show that the armies and divisions must make detailed plans for the movement of an army missile brigade and tactical missile battalions, respectively. In the latter case it will be necessary to take into consideration army orders for the employment of these battalions in grouped strikes.

In order to ensure maximum participation of missile units in grouped and massed nuclear strikes, the staff of the rocket troops and artillery of a front determines the siting area from which the units must be ready to deliver the strikes. In a number of cases, if plans have been made for the use of an army missile brigade in a massed strike by a front, the brigade may be moved in full complement in accordance with the plan of the front.

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The movement of mobile missile-technical bases must be planned in a way that will ensure their maximum productivity in the preparation of missiles and their rapid delivery to the missile units. Experience has shown that an army missile-technical base can be moved daily a distance of 70 to 100 kilometers, while a mobile missile-technical base supporting an army brigade can be moved once every 1.5 to two days in moves of 150 to 180 kilometers. If an army has a mixed mobile missile-technical base, it should be moved by units (subunits for the preparation of tactical missiles should be moved separately from subunits for the preparation of operational-tactical missiles).

It should be pointed out that the presence of a mixed mobile missile-technical base in an army tends to complicate both control as well as the organization of cooperation between it and the missile units.

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